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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the number of reported cases involving allegations of peer
sexual harassment' at primary and secondary schools has increased
dramatically.2 Indeed, newspapers are filled with stories of real and alleged
peer sexual harassment, involving young children on the playground and in the
classroom.3 In perhaps the most reported recent case, a North Carolina school
district punished a six year old boy, Johnathon Prevette, for kissing a female
classmate on the playground.4 Such cases create the misimpression that peer
sexual harassment is not a legitimate problem in the nation's schools and that
school districts tend to overreact to complaints of peer sexual harassment.'
While school officials have overreacted in some cases, numerous legitimate
instances of peer sexual harassment occur every year.6 As a result, institutional
liability for peer sexual harassment has become an important issue of public
policy in the nation's courts and legislative bodies.
1. In this Article, the term "peer sexual harassment" refers exclusively to student
harassment of other students. It does not include faculty members, coaches, administrators, or
other staff members harassing students.
2. Sylvia Hermann Bukoffsky, Note, School District Liability for Student-Inflicted
Sexual Harassment: SchoolAdministrators Learn a Lesson Under Title IX, 42 WAYNE L. RFV.
171, 186 (1995); see also Dawn A. Ellison, Comment, Sexual Harassment in Education: A
Review ofStandardsforlnstitutionalLiability Under Title IX, 75 N.C. L. REv. 2049,2060 (1997)
(noting that Franklin v. Givinnett County Public Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992) is the impetus for
a recent increase in education-related sexual harassment claims); Wendy G. Winters, Book
Review, When Bias Hinders SchoolPerformance, WASH. POST, Aug. 6, 1995, Education Review
at 20 (noting that reports of in-school sexual harassment of girls by boys are increasing).
3. See, e.g., Cathy Cummins, Girl, 10, Accused of Sexual Harassing After
Determining Boy Was Teased, School Backs Off Suspension Threat, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Nov.
1, 1997, at 4A ("A fifth grade girl ... was accused of sexual harassment and threatened with
suspension ... for asking a classmate if he liked her."); Geoffrey Etnyre, Getting Front Page
Fever Ever' Day, WASH. TIMES, May 19, 1997, at F10 (reporting that a six year old North
Carolina boy was suspended from school for sexual harassment after kissing a girl on the
playground).
4. Ellison, supra note 2, at 2049.
5. Kathleen Megan, Sexual Harassment a Part of Most Students' Education,
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Unfortunately, the appropriate standard of liability for peer sexual
harassment in higher education has not been finally adjudicated or determined
in the United States. Courts and commentators disagree whether, and under
what circumstances, an educational institution may be held liable for peer
sexual harassment. The federal circuit courts are split on the issue of liability
under Title IX' for ignoring or improperly investigating and handling peer
sexual harassment. Several decisions suggest that courts can apply Title VII
sexual harassment principles in Title IX peer sexual harassment cases by
analogy, 8 but at least two circuit courts have rejected that conclusion.9 One of
those circuits rejects any kind of institutional liability under Title IX for peer
sexual harassment."0 The other circuit holds that a school can be held liable for
peer sexual harassment under Title IX only if it somehow treats complaints by
female students differently than it treats complaints by male students." And
most recently, the Supreme Court has rejected applying Title VII standards to
a Title IX teacher-student sexually hostile environment case.'2
To further complicate matters, in March 1997 the United States
Department of Education's Office of Civil Rights ("OCR") issued a set of
written guidelines entitled "Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of
Students by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties"'3 (the
"Guidance"). The Guidance applies to students at every educational level, from
kindergarten through higher education. While the Guidance is mandatory for
educational institutions, the federal courts have evinced an unwillingness to
follow it.'
4
This Article sets forth the argument that the constructive notice standard
of liability contained in the Guidance should not apply to peer sexual
harassment cases in the higher education setting. The Article also asserts that
courts should not apply Title VII sexual harassment principles in Title IX cases
7. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994). Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 ("Title
IX") mandates that individuals may not be discriminated against on the basis of their sex in any
educational programs or activities that receive federal funding.
8. See, e.g., Doe v. University of ll., 138 F.3d 653, 665-67 (7th Cir. 1998) (applying
Title VII standards); Brzonkalav. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949,959-61
(4th Cir. 1997), vacated & reh'ggranted (4th Cir. Feb. 5,1998) (applying Title VII constructive
notice standard); Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226,1132 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Davis v. Monroe
Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1194 (1 1th Cir. 1996)); Davis, 74 F.3d at 1194 (applying Title VII
principles).
9. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1392 (1Ith Cir. 1997)
(affirming district court's refusal to apply Title VII principles); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch.
Dist., 80 F.3d 1006, 1016 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that a cause of action for peer sexual
harassment exists only when the school treats males' and females' complaints differently);
Morse v. Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 154 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 1998) (altering the Tenth
Circuit's test for institutional liability without explicitly overruling Seamons v. Snow).
10. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1406.
11. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016.
12. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998).
13. 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997) [hereinafter Guidance].
14. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
1998]
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alleging institutional liability for peer sexual harassment. Finally, the Article
demonstrates that the rationale of those cases finding institutional liability for
peer sexual harassment at the primary and secondary school levels should not
be extended to colleges and universities. As will be discussed, the nature of the
relationship between primary and secondary educational institutions and their
students is fundamentally different from the relationship between higher
education institutions and their students. Moreover, the legal duty for
negligence that is owed to college students by higher education institutions is
substantially lower than the legal duty for negligence owed to students by
primary and secondary schools. The OCR's attempt, through the Guidance, to
place colleges and universities on the same plane as primary and secondary
schools with respect to institutional liability for peer sexual harassment is
fundamentally flawed and unsupported by recent developments in the case law.
It should thus be rejected by the courts.
Part II of this Article summarizes and discusses the Guidance. Part III
discusses the leading reported peer sexual harassment cases involving primary
and secondary schools, highlighting the dearth of peer sexual harassment cases
involving colleges and universities. Part III also discusses the split of authority
in the federal courts concerning the applicability of Title VII principles in Title
IX peer sexual harassment cases. Finally, Part IV advances the argument that
the rationale of the peer harassment cases involving primary and secondary
schools does not make sense in the higher education setting and should not be
applied in cases arising at colleges and universities.
II. THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION GUIDANCE
The OCR recently adopted the Guidance to outline the proper steps
"schools"'" must take in response to sexual harassment complaints. Following
the Supreme Court's decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools6
and its progeny, the Guidance indicates that sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination prohibited by Title IX. The Guidance identifies two types of
sexual harassment: quid pro quo and hostile environment. The Guidance
defines quid pro quo sexual harassment as any case where "[a] school
employee explicitly or implicitly conditions a student's participation in an
education program or activity or bases an educational decision on the student's
submission to unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, or other
verbal, nonverbal, or physical conduct of a sexual nature."' 7 The Guidance
defines hostile environment sexual harassment as sexually harassing conduct
15. The Guidance defines "school" to include primary and secondary institutions,
colleges, and universities. Guidance, supra note 13, at 12,038.
16. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). In Franklin, a teacher to student harassment case, the Court
applied legal principles that courts established in workplace sexual harassment cases under Title
VII to school sexual harassment cases.
17. Guidance, supra note 13, at 12,038 (endnote omitted).
[Vol. 50:55
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"by an employee, by another student, or by a third party that is sufficiently
severe, persistent, or pervasive to limit a student's ability to participate in or
benefit from an educational program or activity, orto create a hostile or abusive
educational environment."'"
The Guidance states that Title IX applies to all public and private schools
receiving federal funding and defines "education program or activity" as "all
of the academic, educational, extra-curricular, athletic, and other programs of
the school, whether they take place in the facilities of the school, on a school
bus, at a class or training program sponsored by the school at another location,
or elsewhere."' 9 With regard to whom Title IX protects, the Guidance is clear
that both male and female students are to be protected against sexual
harassment, regardless of the sex of the victim or the harasser.2"
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,2'
the Guidance applies agency principles to determine a school's liability for
sexual harassment.2 The Guidance breaks the discussion of liability into two
categories: (1) cases involving sexual harassment of students by employees of
the school and (2) cases involving sexual harassment of students by peers or
third parties.'
According to the Guidance, a school may be held liable under Title IX for
the sexual harassment of a student by one or more other students if: "(i) a
hostile environment exists in the school's programs or activities, (ii) the school
knows or should have known of the harassment, and (iii) the school fails to take
immediate and appropriate corrective action. 24 Under this standard, a school
is not responsible on an agency theory for the actions of its students or third
parties. It is only potentially liable for its institutional response to a complaint
of peer sexual harassment, such as its investigation (or failure to properly
investigate) or response to such a complaint.'




21. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). In Vinson, the Court ruled that Title VII covers hostile
environment sexual harassment in the workplace. Id. at 65-67. The Court established that "[flor
sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the
conditions of... employment and create an abusive working environment."' Id. at 67 (quoting
Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (1 1th Cir. 1982)).
22. Guidance, supra note 13, at 12,039.
23. Id. at 12,039-40. The former category is beyond the scope of this Article and will
not be addressed. Similarly, potential institutional liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment
is not addressed in this Article because this form of sexual harassment, by definition, typically
does not involve peers or peer sexual harassment but employees of the educational institution.
24. Id. at 12,039. The Department of Education followed the principles set forth in
the Restatement (Second) of Agency. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: LIABILITY OF
PRINCIPAL TO THIRD PERSON; TORTS § 219.2(b) (1958) (stating "[a] master is not subject to
liability for the torts of his servants acting outside the scope of their employment, unless: ... (b)
the master was negligent or reckless.").
25. Guidance, supra note 13, at 12,040.
1998]
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in each case if the action in question constituted sexual harassment, and
whether the school had notice of the harassment. If both criteria are met, the
DOE must assess the appropriateness ofthe school's actions in dealing with the
situation. In making the initial determination that sexual harassment occurred,
the Guidance focuses on two primary elements: (1) the welcomeness of the
conduct and (2) the persistence and pervasiveness of the conduct.26
Conduct is considered to be unwelcome if "the student did not request or
invite it and 'regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive."'2 7 This is not
a simple determination to make. A student's failure to resist or complain about
sexually harassing conduct does not necessarily mean that the student
welcomed the conduct.28 Several factors must be considered to answer the
question of welcomeness. The ages of the student and the alleged harasser are
key factors: the younger the student, the stronger the presumption that the
conduct was unwelcome.29 From this standpoint, as the age of the student
increases, the presumption of unwelcomeness decreases.3" The relationship of
the harasser and the victim is also an important consideration. In a case of peer
sexual harassment, where the welcomeness of the conduct is in question, a
determination must be made based on the "totality of the circumstances."3' This
standard is not clearly developed or defined in the reported cases or the
Guidance.
The alleged misconduct must also be severe, persistent, or pervasive to
constitute sexual harassment. To make this determination, the Guidance uses
the two-pronged test established by the United States Supreme Court in Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc.32 In Harris the Court concluded that conduct rises to
the level of sexual harassment when an abusive environment exists in the
subjective view of the victim and in the objective view of a reasonable person. 3
All relevant circumstances must be considered in making this determination. 34
The Guidance lists a number of relevant factors including the age and sex of
both the harasser and the victim, their relationship, and the number of people
involved.35 In addition, the severity and frequency of the conduct are important
26. Id. at 12,040-42.
27. Id. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 903 (11th Cir. 1982)).
28. See id. at 12,040; cf. Lipsett v. University of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898 (Ist Cir.
1988) ("[A] woman's consistent failure to respond to suggestive comments or gestures may be
sufficient to communicate that the man's conduct is unwelcome.").
29. Guidance, supra note 13, at 12,040 ("OCR will never view sexual conduct
between an adult school employee and an elementary school student as consensual.").
30. Id.
31. Id. at 12,041 (including statements of witness, credibility of evidence, history of
harassment, post-confrontation behavior or action, and other contemporaneous evidence).
32. Id. at 12,041 & nn.43-44 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21-22
(1993)).
33. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21-22.
34. Guidance, supra note 13, at 12,041 & n.45 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
35. Id. at 12,041-42.
[Vol. 50: 55
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considerations.36 If conduct is of a sufficiently severe nature, one incident can
constitute hostile environment sexual harassment; if conduct that is not severe
in nature is repeated a number of times, the conduct can rise to the level of
hostile environment sexual harassment.37
If alleged misconduct is unwelcome and sufficiently severe, persistent, or
pervasive, the Guidance requires an examination of whether the school had
notice of the conduct. The Guidance states that "[a] school will be in violation
of Title IX if the school 'has notice' of a sexually hostile environment and fails
to take immediate and appropriate corrective action."'3 A school has notice of
a hostile environment "if it actually 'knew, or in the exercise of reasonable
care, should have known' about the harassment. '39 This definition provides for
both actual and constructive notice of the sexual harassment by "an agent or
responsible employee of the school."4 A determination of who constitutes an
agent or responsible employee will depend on such factors as the "authority
actually given to the employee and the age of the student."'" Actual notice can
exist if the harassment is directly reported to a school employee, if the
employee actually witnessed the harassment, or if the employee received
information about the harassment from an indirect source such as a member of
the community or the media.42
The Guidance allows for constructive notice of the harassment to exist "if
the school would have found out about the harassment through a 'reasonably
diligent inquiry.' 43 While this standard is highly dependent upon the facts of
a particular case, the Guidance does provide examples of constructive notice
or knowledge. If a school knows of some incidents of sexual harassment, it
may be liable for additional cases if the DOE determines that an investigation
of the known incidents would have led to the discovery of the other cases."4 A
school also has constructive notice "if the harassment is widespread, openly
practiced, or well-known to students and staff.,45 This could be the case if the
harassment occurs in the open, such as in the hallways of the school, or if it
takes the form of such things as graffiti in public areas.46
Once the school has either actual or constructive notice of the possible
sexually harassing conduct, "[the school] should take immediate and
appropriate steps to investigate... and take steps reasonably calculated to end
any harassment, eliminate a hostile environment if one has been created, and
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 12,042.
39. Id. (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 881 (9th Cir. 1991)).
40. Id.
41. Id. at n.65.
42. Id. at 12,042.






Hoye and Hahn: Beyond the Camel's Nose: Institutional Liability for Peer Sexual
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
prevent harassment from occurring again."" The Guidance requires each
school to have in place a prompt and equitable grievance procedure for sexual
harassment. s Even if a case of sexual harassment has not occurred in a school,
that school will still be in violation of Title IX if it does not have procedures in
place for dealing with sexual harassment.49 A nondiscrimination policy and
grievance procedures are sufficient to meet this requirement as long as they
deal effectively with the problem of sexual harassment.50 The Guidance
outlines a number of elements to considerwhen determining whether a school's
policy is equipped to handle sexual harassment claims sufficiently, including
the following: (1) whether students, parents, and employees have notice
concerning how to file a complaint; (2) whether the policy provides for
adequate, reliable, and impartial investigation of complaints; (3) whether the
policy designates reasonably prompt timeframes for major parts of the
complaint process; and (4) whether the policy provides notice to the parties of
the outcome of the complaint.5' A school must ensure that students are aware
of the grievance procedure and how it works. 2 In addition, every school must
designate at least one employee to coordinate complaints and carry out the
school's Title IX responsibilities.53 This employee musthave adequate training
in what constitutes sexual harassment, 4 and schools must make all students and
employees aware of the designated person's identity, address, and telephone
number."'
Once a school has notice of sexual harassment, it is required under Title IX
to investigate the alleged incident, even if the victim does not request an
investigation.56 If the school receives notice from a third party of the alleged
harassment, the school must weigh several factors to determine whether it can
confirm the complaint and whether investigation of the allegations is
reasonable. If the school can confirm the allegations, it must then proceed
with an investigation of the alleged harassment. 8 While this investigation is
ongoing, the school may have to take interim measures to ensure that the
alleged harassment does not continued. 9 Such measures could include moving
the alleged target or harasser into another class or living facility. However,
47. Id.




52. Id. at 12,045.
53. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a) (1997)).
54. Id.
55. Id. (citing 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(a) (1997)).
56. Id. at 12,042.
57. Id. at 12,044; see supra text accompanying note 51 (listing factors school must
weigh).
58. Guidance, supra note 13, at 12,044.
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during the investigation process, the school must take every available measure
to protect the identities of the parties involved."s Once the school, through its
investigation, determines that sexual harassment did occur, "it should take
reasonable, timely, age-appropriate, and effective corrective action, including
steps tailored to the specific situation."'62 For example, a school could warn or
take disciplinary action against the harasser, depending upon the severity of the
conduct.63 Furthermore, if the school determines that the harassment has
created a hostile environment, the school is responsible for eliminating the
hostility and for taking reasonable steps to correct its effects.' These steps
could include moving the target or harasser and ensuring that student's
academic record is not adversely affected by the move.65 If the school
determines that the hostile environment has affected an entire class or group of
students, the school may have to provide the students with additional
information on sexual harassment and take other similar measures to repair the
educational environment.6 6
Before applying the Guidance to a higher education setting, this Article
first examines the well-developed body of case law on Title IX peer sexual
harassment at the kindergarten through twelfth grade level. The case law
highlights a number of critically important distinctions between higher
education institutions and primary and secondary schools. The cases emphasize
the different levels of control these two types of educational institutions
exercise over their students and the legal duties they owe to their respective
students for issues such as negligence.
III. THE CASE LAW
A. Supreme Court Decisions Concerning Title IX Sexual Harassment
The history of sexual harassment litigation under Title IX begins in large
part with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Cannon v. University
of Chicago.67 In Cannon a female student filed suits against two private
medical schools after they denied her admission.68 The student alleged that the
institutions had discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in violation of
Title IX.69 The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the district court's dismissal of her complaint, ruling that Title IX does not
61. Id. at 12,037.





67. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
68. Id. at 680 & n.1.
69. Id. at 680 & n.2.
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create a private cause of action.70 The Seventh Circuit noted that Title IX does
not expressly authorize a private right of action and ruled that Congress
intended termination of the institution's financial support to be the sole remedy
for a Title IX violation.7' The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Congress
patterned Title IX after Title VI. 72 Moreover, at the time Congress enacted Title
IX "the critical language in Title VI had already been construed as creating a
private remedy."73 Therefore, the Court concluded that a school in violation of
Title IX has the potential of losing federal funding and being liable to an
individual plaintiff.74
Following Cannon, the Court's next major step in Title LX sexual
harassment claims was its decision in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools.75 Franklin involved a student's allegation of sexual harassment by a
teacher. Franklin is the closest the Supreme Court has ever come to making a
definitive statement on the liability of schools for failing to stop sexual
harassment. Many lower courts that have attempted to deal with this problem
have considered the case as a cornerstone on the issue.76 In Franklin the Court
considered a female student's Title IX claim for monetary damages against her
school for its failure to stop a teacher from sexually harassing her.77 The student
alleged that the school had actual knowledge of the harassment, and that it
failed to take necessary actions to stop the harassment.78 The Court noted that
remedies available under Spending Clause statutes were limited when the
school's conduct was unintentional.79 Spending Clause statutes are meant to put
schools on notice that if they accept funding under the statute, they will be held
accountable if they intentionally violate it."° Spending Clause statutes give
schools the option, albeit a limited one, of accepting or rejecting governmental
funding.3' The Court ruled that notice was not a problem in Franklin because
it considered sexual harassment of a student by a teacher to be intentional
conduct on the part of the school.8" The Court wrote:
70. Id. at 683.
71. Id. at 683-84.
72. Id. at 694. Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides: "No
person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
73. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 696.
74. Id. at 704-05.
75. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
76. See, e.g., Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653, 660 (7th Cir. 1998) (considering
Franklin); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 949 F. Supp. 1415,1416-18 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (noting
the importance of Franklin).
77. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63.
78. Id. at 64.
79. Id. at 74 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 28-29
(1981)).
80. Id. (citing Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17).
81. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 29.
82. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74-75.
[Vol. 50:55
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The point of not permitting monetary damages for an
unintentional violation is that the receiving entity of federal
funds lacks notice that it will be liable for a monetary award.
This notice problem does not arise in a case such as this, in
which intentional discrimination is alleged. Unquestionably,
Title IX placed on the Gwinnett County Public Schools the
duty not to discriminate on the basis of sex, and "when a
supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the
basis of sex." We believe the same rule should apply when a
teacher sexually harasses and abuses a student. Congress
surely did not intend for federal moneys to be expended to
support the intentional actions it sought by statute to
proscribe."
In reaching its conclusion, the Court combined the implied cause of action
under Title IX from Cannon with the cause of action provided to employees
under Title VII for sexual harassment by their superiors. The Court's reference
to "intentional actions" and its citation to Meritor, a Title VII sexual
harassment case, have led to vast amounts of uncertainty, confusion, and debate
in peer sexual harassment case law.
The most recent Supreme Court decision concerning school liability for
sexual harassment, Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,84
attempted to clear up some of this uncertainty. In Gebser an eighth grade girl
had a consensual sexual relationship with one of her male teachers.8 5 The
teacher initiated the relationship, which continued for several months without
the school board or the girl's parents' knowledge. 6 After a police officer
discovered the teacher and the student during a sexual encounter, the school
district immediately fired the teacher.8 7 At the time, the Lago Vista School
District did not have a grievance procedure or anti-harassment policy in place.88
Gebser filed suit against the school district, alleging violations of Title IX.s9
83. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64
(1986)).
84. 118 S. Ct. 1989 (1998). In addition to Gebser, the Supreme Court decided three
other important sexual harassment cases in 1998. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 118 S. Ct.
2275 (1998); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Oncale v. Sundower
Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998). However, these cases were not peer sexual
harassment cases, with the exception of Oncale, which was purely a Title VII case and did not
address the standard of liability. In addition, all of these cases arose in the workplace under Title
VII, not in an educational setting under Title IX. Therefore, they are beyond the scope of this
Article.







Hoye and Hahn: Beyond the Camel's Nose: Institutional Liability for Peer Sexual
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
The district court dismissed the plaintiff's claim on the grounds that the school
district had no notice of the harassment.9" The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the dismissal.9'
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Gebser alleged that in light
of the Court's Franklin decision, the school district should be held liable even
if it had only constructive notice of the harassment.92 In making this argument,
Gebser relied upon the Guidance. 93 But the Court rejected Gebser's
constructive notice argument, indicating that its reference to Meritor in the
Franklin decision was not intended to establish a constructive notice standard.94
The majority wrote:
Whether educational institutions can be said to violate
Title IX based solely on principles of respondeat superior or
constructive notice was not resolved by Franklin's citation of
Meritor. That reference to Meritor was made with regard to
the general proposition that sexual harassment can constitute
discrimination on the basis of sex under Title IX.95
Having addressed the ambiguity in its Franklin decision, the Court went on to
consider Congress' intent in enacting Title IX. After concluding that Congress
did not intend to permit unlimited recovery under Title IX without notice, the
Court concluded "that it would 'frustrate the purposes' of Title IX to permit a
damages recovery against a school district for a teacher's sexual harassment of
a studentbased onprinciples of respondeatsuperior or constructive notice (i.e.,
without actual notice to a school district official)." '96 The Court held that a
school has actual notice when "an official who at a minimum has authority to
address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the
recipient's behalf'97 is informed. Once such an official is informed, the school
still will not be held liable unless the school's response to the alleged
harassment amounts to "deliberate indifference to discrimination. ' When a
plaintiff meets all of these burdens, then a court will hold a school district
responsible for the harassment, and the plaintiff may recover.99
While Gebser dealt with a teacher-student sexual harassment scenario, it
should prove instructive in addressing the issue of institutional liability for peer
sexual harassment. Gebser clarifies the Court's intent in Franklin with its
90. Id. at 1993-94.
91. Id. at 1994.
92. Id. at 1995.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. (citing Oncale v. Sundower Offshore Servs., Inc., 118 S. Ct. 998 (1998)).
96. Id. at 1997.
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citation to Meritor. This is an important development in that, as will be
discussed below, the federal courts have interpreted the citation in
fundamentally different ways, reaching opposite outcomes in factually similar
cases. Gebser is also important in that it acknowledges the Guidance and its
call for a constructive notice standard but rejects the Guidance's constructive
notice standard in an entire classification of teacher-student harassment cases.
B. Circuit Court Decisions Concerning Title IXPeer Sexual Harassment
Among the United States Courts of Appeals, five circuits (the Eleventh,
Fifth, Tenth, Fourth, and Seventh) appear to have considered the issue of peer
sexual harassment in schools. 00
1. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education'' presented the Eleventh
Circuit with a Title IX peer sexual harassment case. InDavis a fifth grader filed
suit under Title IX against her school for failure to keep a male classmate from
sexually harassing her bothphysically and verbally.0 2 The harassment occurred
over a six-month period and involved sexually charged verbal assaults and
physical touching. 0 3 The girl's mother, on several occasions, requested the
school principal's intervention, but the school took no action to separate the
children or to discipline the boy."° The mother eventually contacted the local
police; they charged the boy, and he pled guilty to sexual battery.'05 The
complaint in the district court alleged that the victim's grades and emotional
well-being suffered to the point that she wrote a suicide note. 6 However, the
district court dismissed her complaint, holding that the harassing behavior was
not part of a school activity or program. 7
A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit initially interpreted the
Supreme Court's decision in Franklin and reversed the district court's
dismissal, ruling that Title IX does allow such a claim. 8 In assessing the
school's liability, the court applied a Title VII test, citing the Supreme Court's
100. See Doe v. University of ll., 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998); Brzonkala v. Virginia
Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997); Davis v. Monroe Bd. of Educ., 74
F.3d 1186 (11 th Cir. 1996); Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996);
Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1126 (10th Cir. 1996).
101. 74 F.3d 1186 (1 Ith Cir. 1996), vacated & reh"g en banc granted, 91 F.3d 1418
(11 th Cir. 1996). The court of appeals affirmed the district court on rehearing. Davis v. Monroe
County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (1lth Cir. 1997).
102. Davis, 74 F.3d at 1188-89.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 1189.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1188.
108. Id. at 1191.
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reference to Meritor in Franklin."9 Under this test, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) that she is a member of a protected group; (2) that she was
subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the
harassment was based on sex; (4) that the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the conditions of
her education and create an abusive educational environment;
and (5) that some basis for institutional liability has been
established."'
As for the institutional liability in the fifth part of the test, the court applied a
Title VII constructive notice standard that would make the school liable if it
"knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to take
prompt remedial action.' Under this standard, a plaintiff does not have to
prove that the school had actual knowledge of the harassment. Constructive
knowledge is sufficient to prove intentional discrimination on the part of a
school." 2
The initial Davis decision had a major impact on peer sexual harassment
law. Following Davis many of the lower courts that considered this issue
adopted either the Davis court's five-part test or a variation of it." 13 However,
the Eleventh Circuit vacated the initial Davis decision and granted an en banc
rehearing."4 In its en banc rehearing," 5 the Eleventh Circuit completely
departed from the conclusions reached by the initial panel. The en banc court
ruled that Title IX does not allow a student to bring a peer sexual harassment
claim against a school." 6 The court based its decision in large measure on its
analysis of statutes passed by Congress pursuant to the Spending Clause. " 7 The
court held that "[w]hen Congress enacts legislation pursuant to the Spending
Clause, it in effect offers to form a contract with potential recipients of federal
funding."".. The court viewed this contractual relationship as completely
voluntary. "To ensure the voluntariness of participation in federal programs, the
Supreme Court has required Congress to give potential recipients unambiguous
notice of the conditions they are assuming when they accept federal
funding.""A9 The Eleventh Circuit ruled that the only sexual harassment
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1194.
111. Id. at 1195 (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir.
1982)).
112. Id.
113. See infra Part III.C.
114. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 91 F.3d 1418 (11 th Cir. 1996).
115. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 120 F.3d 1390 (1 th Cir. 1997).
116. Id. at 1406.
117. Id. at 1399.
118. Id.
119. Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman,451 U.S. 1, 17(1981)).
[Vol. 50: 55
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violation of which the schools had notice when they accepted federal funding
was teacher-to-student sexual harassment.1 20 The court found that allowing a
cause of action for peer sexual harassment would place schools at risk of a
large number of suits and enormous litigation expenses.' 2 ' This increased risk,
in the court's opinion, would force schools to reconsider their decision to
accept federal funding.'
The en banc Eleventh Circuit also ruled that Title VII liability standards
cannot be applied in Title IX cases because Congress enacted Title VII
pursuant to the Commerce Clause and to the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution, not pursuant to the Spending Clause." The court
deemed Title IX liability to be much narrower than Title VII liability. The court
noted that the agency principles which attach liability under Title VII are not
applicable in the peer sexual harassment context because the relationship
between employers and employees is not comparable to the relationship
between a school and its students.
124
Inreaching this holding, the court considered andrejected the Guidance.125
As indicated in Part II of this Article, the Guidance calls for the application of
Title VII standards in Title IX peer sexual harassment cases, including the Title
VII "knew or should have known" standard. 26 In considering and rejecting the
Guidance's standard of constructive notice, the Eleventh Circuit wrote:
According to the OCR, however, the official may be liable
even if he did not know about the harassment: the official
may cause the school to violate Title IX if he failed to
exercise "due care" in discovering the misconduct ....
According to appellant and the Department of Justice, the
Board received clear notice of this form of liability when it
accepted federal funding under Title IX. We think not.
127
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit clearly took into account the
standards that the Guidance established and rejected them in the context of peer
sexual harassment cases.
2. Rowinsky v. Bryan Independent School District
The Fifth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Rowinsky v. Bryan
120. Id. at 1401.
121. Id. at 1401, 1404.
122. Id. at 1401.
123. Id. at 1401 n.13.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1401 n.23 (citing Guidance, supra note 13, at 12,034).
126. See supra text accompanying note 39.
127. Davis, 120 F.3d at 1405 n.23 (citation omitted).
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Independent School District.'28 In Rowinsky the mother of two eighth-grade
girls brought a Title IX action against the school district for peer sexual
harassment. Boys riding on the same public school bus allegedly verbally and
physically harassed the girls on many occasions.'29 One boy regularly swatted
one of the girl's bottoms in the aisle of the bus, asked for her bra and panty
sizes, and called her degrading names. 3 He also grabbed one girl's genital
area.' The girls complained to the school bus driver about the harassing
conduct at least eight times.'32 In addition, the girls' mother complained to
school officials on several occasions. 33
Nevertheless, the district court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim
under Title IX because no evidence existed to prove the school district
discriminated against the plaintiffs on the basis of sex.'34 In assessing the
plaintiffs' claim, the Fifth Circuit gave great weight to the fact that Congress
enacted Title IX under the Spending Clause.'35 The court found that
"[i]mposing liability for the acts of third parties would be incompatible with the
purpose of a spending condition, because grant recipients have little control
over the multitude of third parties who could conceivably violate the
prohibitions of [T]itle IX.'
136
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit narrowly construed intentional sex
discrimination. The court noted that Congress discussed only grant recipients'
potential practices in the congressional debates leading to the passage of Title
IX.' Congress did not consider actions of third parties and students on the
record in the passage of the statute. As a result, the Fifth Circuit concluded:
In the case of peer sexual harassment, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the school district responded to sexual
harassment claims differently based on sex. Thus, a school
district might violate [T]itle IX if it treated sexual harassment
of boys more seriously than sexual harassment of girls, or
even if it turned a blind eye toward sexual harassment of girls
while addressing assaults that harmed boys.'38
The Fifth Circuit, therefore, did recognize a limited cause of action against
128. 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir. 1996).





134. Id. at 1010.
135. Id. at 1012-13.
136. Id. at 1013.
137. Id. at 1013-14 (citing Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704
(1979); 118 CoNG. REc. 5803-12 (1972)).
138. Rowinsky, 80 F.3d at 1016.
[Vol. 50: 55
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schools for intentional discrimination in peer sexual harassment cases.
However, requiring a plaintiff to show disparate treatment by a school in order
to prevail severely limits the universe of circumstances under which a student
will be successful when bringing a peer sexual harassment claim against a
school in the Fifth Circuit.
3. Seamons v. Snow
One month after the Rowinsky decision, the Tenth Circuit, in Seamons v.
Snow,'39 considered a unique peer sexual harassment case involving the hazing
of a male high school student, Brian Seamons. Seamons's football teammates
tied him, without clothes, to a towel bar in the school's locker room. 40 The
teammates then brought one of Seamons's former girlfriends into the locker
room to witness the incident. 4 ' Seamons reported the incident to the
administration, including the school's football coach and principal.'42 The
football coach ordered Seamons to apologize to the team forbetraying themby
reporting the incident, and when he refused to apologize, the coach removed
him from the team. 43 The school district responded to the incident by canceling
the final football game of the season.'" Seamons claimed that after the
cancellation of the game his fellow students "threatened and harassed" him.4
In his subsequent Title IX hostile environment claim, Seamons alleged that
the school's response to the incident was sexually discriminatory because the
school expected him to "conform to a macho male stereotype."'" Seamons
argued that his football coach's suggestion that he "should have taken it like a
man" evidenced the sexual discrimination.47 In considering Seamons's claim,
the Tenth Circuit adopted the five-part test used by the Eleventh Circuit panel
in its original, now vacated, Davis decision.4 However, in applying the test,
the Tenth Circuit did not rule on the proper standard of liability for the school.
The court concluded that Seamons failed to make even a threshold showing
that he had been discriminated against or harassed on the basis of his gender. '49
Even though the school's response to the incident may have led to the hostility
that Seamons faced from his classmates, the court concluded that the school's
decision to cancel the final football game was not an attempt "to exacerbate or
139. 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996).








148. Id. at 1232 (citing Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1194
(11 th Cir. 1996)).
149. Id. at 1233.
1998]
17
Hoye and Hahn: Beyond the Camel's Nose: Institutional Liability for Peer Sexual
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
create a hostile sexual environment for Brian."' 50 Because Seamons's case did
not rise to the level of sexual harassment, the court did not reach the question
of institutional liability or the appropriate legal standard for such liability,
noting that the legal standard remains unclear.' The Tenth Circuit dealt with
this uncertainty again in Morse v. Regents of the University of Colorado.
5 2
4. Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
A three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit addressed institutional liability
for peer sexual harassment in the case Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic
Institute & State University. 3 Within several months, the Fourth Circuit
vacated the three-judge panel's decision and granted en banc review before the
full Fourth Circuit. As of this writing, the Fourth Circuit has not rendered a
decision. However, the recently vacated panel decision remains instructive
because it is the first judicial decision to find institutional liability in a college
or university peer sexual harassment case. The case involved a Virginia Tech
freshman who was allegedly raped by two members of the university's football
team.5 4 A panel that conducted a university disciplinary hearing under the
University's Sexual Assault Policy found one player, who admitted to having
sex with Brzonkala after she objected, violated the policy and suspended that
player from the university for two semesters. s' Citing the university's failure
to follow properly its own internal policies and procedures for dealing with
sexual assault allegations, the player appealed the suspension and threatened
to sue the school on due process grounds. 6 The university gave the player a
second hearing, this time under the University's Abusive Conduct Policy; the
panel in the second hearing found the player violated a university policy
prohibiting the use of abusive language.1 7 Again, the school gave him a two-
semester suspension."' However, the university's Senior Vice President and
Provost-citing as precedent the punishments meted out in prior cases involving
violations of the Abusive Conduct Policy-ruled that the suspension was too
harsh a penalty. 9 Based on this ruling, Virginia Tech permitted the player to
return.'
60
No one informed Brzonkala of the Provost's ruling. She discovered it by
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1232 n.7.
152. See infra Part III.B.6.
153. 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir. 1997), vacated & reh'ggranted (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998).
154. Id. at 953.
155. Id. at 954. With respect to the second student-athlete, the panel found
insufficient evidence of a violation. Id.
156. Id.






South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 50, Iss. 1 [], Art. 4
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol50/iss1/4
PEER SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON CAMPUS
reading a newspaper article.16' Upon learning that the player was again on
campus, Brzonkala feared for her safety and declined to return for the fall
semester. 62 Brzonkala felt that the university's actions displayed a disbelief in
her allegations and filed suit against the university, alleging several claims,
including a Title IX violation based on the university's failure to handle her
rape claim adequately and to punish the admitted offender.'63 However, the
district court dismissed her Title IX claim.'
On appeal, a three-judge panel of the Fourth Circuit ruled that it must apply
Title VII principles in assessing the university's liability under Title IX. 65 In
doing so, the court adopted the same five-part test that the Eleventh Circuit
adopted in its original, now vacated, Davis decision. On the notice prong of the
test, the court wrote, "We must determine whether Brzonkala has alleged facts
sufficient to support an inference that Virginia Tech 'knew or should have
known of the illegal conduct and failed to take prompt and adequate remedial
action."1 66 With this statement, the Fourth Circuitbecame the only circuit court
in the country to adopt a Title VII standard of constructive notice for peer
sexual harassment. However, because the university had actual notice, the court
did not further develop its constructive notice standard. 7 The court simply
ruled that the rape itself created a hostile environment for Brzonkala, and the
university had a duty to take remedial action.'68 The university's reversal of its
suspension decision and what the panel obviously perceived as an apparent lack
of any real punishment for the player created a question as to whether the
university acted reasonably in responding to the plaintiff s harassment claim.'69
5. Doe v. University of Illinois
Shortly following the Brzonkala decision, the Seventh Circuit considered
the issue of institutional liability for peer sexual harassment in Doe v.
University of llinois.170 The case involved a female student at University High
School who was subjected to a campaign of verbal and physical sexual




164. Id. Ms. Brzonkala also made claims under the Violence Against Women Act of
1994, which the district court declared unconstitutional. Id. Those claims and that ruling are
beyond the scope of this Article.
165. Id. at 957.
166. Id. at 960 (quoting Andrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc., 88 F.3d 258,261 (4th
Cir. 1996) (applying Title VII in the context of employment discrimination)).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 959-60.
169. Id. at961.
170. 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998).
171. Id. at 655.
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her parents reported the harassment to different school officials. 7 ' However,
the reports did not succeed in putting an end to the harassment. '73 Doe filed suit
against the University of Illinois, which was affiliated with the defendant public
high school, claiming that the school violated Title IX by failing to deal with
the hostile environment to which Doe was subjected. 74 The district court
dismissed Doe's claim, adopting the rationale of the Fifth Circuit in Rowinsky
for establishing a school's liability for peer sexual harassment under Title IX
(i.e., that schools can only be found liable in this context if they treat claims
involving boys differently than claims involving girls).1
75
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit examined the analysis used by the Fifth and
Eleventh Circuits. The panel explicitly rejected the Fifth Circuit's agency
rationale for not holding schools liable for the actions of its students.'76 The
Seventh Circuit wrote that schools in peer sexual harassment cases are being
held responsible for their own actions in dealing with the harassment, not the
actions of their students engaging in the harassment. 7 7 The Seventh Circuit
views this distinction as a flaw in the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Rowinsky.171
The court then analyzed the Eleventh Circuit's Spending Clause reasoning
in its en banc Davis decision. The Seventh Circuit noted that the Eleventh
Circuit was correct in finding that legislation enacted pursuant to the Spending
Clause creates a contract with the recipients of the federal funding. 79 However,
the Seventh Circuit found that the Davis court was too narrow in its
interpretation of Title IX.' The court wrote that in making its Spending Clause
inquiry, the Eleventh Circuit looked primarily at the legislative history of Title
IX and "[f]inding no mention in the legislative history of student-on-student
sexual harassment... the court concluded that schools were not 'on notice'
that they might be held liable for failing properly to address sexual harassment
by students."' 8 The Seventh Circuit noted that even though Title IX and its
legislative history do not explicitly address teacher-on-student sexual
harassment, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized such a cause of action in
Franklin.8' The court held that the Eleventh Circuit's overly-narrow reading
of Title IX was inconsistent with the goals of the statute'83 and, thus, rejected




175. Id. at 661-62.




180. Id. at 665.
18 1. Id. at 664 (quoting Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1401
(I Ith Cir. 1997)).
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Title VII standards it adopted inHunterv. Allis-Chalmers Corp."4 in which the
court held that as long as the harassment was of the type that "'the employer
could have prevented [it] by reasonable care in hiring, supervising, or if
necessary firing the [harasser],' the employer is 'directly liable."" 85 However,
in adopting its Title VII standards in peer sexual harassment cases brought
under Title IX, the Seventh Circuit declined to apply the Title VII constructive
notice standard. Instead, the court followed its decision in Smith v.
Metropolitan School District Perry Township,'86 a teacher-on-student sexual
harassment case in which the court required a showing of actual notice on the
part of the school before it could be found liable. 187 In Smith, the Seventh
Circuit expressly acknowledged that the Guidance adopts a constructive notice
standard for determining liability. 8 However, the court wrote that the "O CR's
interpretation of Title IX is not entitled to strict deference from this Court."'89
Thus, while the Seventh Circuit concluded in Doe that some Title VII
principles do apply in Title IX peer sexual harassment cases, that court-like
the U.S. Supreme Court in Gebser-also determined that schools must be held
to an actual notice standard, not a constructive notice standard, in determining
their liability for improperly handling sexual harassment complaints.' 90 The
court drew no distinction between institutional liability for peer sexual
harassment at the K-12 level and at the higher education level.
6. Morse v. Regents of the University of Colorado
The most recent circuit court decision involving institutional liability for
peer sexual harassment as of this writing comes from the Tenth Circuit in
Morse v. Regents of the Univ;ersity of Colorado.' In Morse two female
Reserve Officer Training Corps ("ROTC") students alleged that their male
ROTC superior officer, who was also a University of Colorado student,
sexually harassed them. 92 The female cadets asserted that they reported the
harassment to both their ROTC superior officer and the university, but both of
these parties failed to respond adequately to the allegations. 93 The female
cadets then filed suit against the university, alleging that it had violated Title
IX by permitting a sexually hostile environment to exist on campus. 4 The
184. Id. at 666-67 (citing Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417 (7th Cir.
1986)).
185. Id. (quoting Hunter, 797 F.2d at 1422).
186. 128 F.3d 1014 (7th Cir. 1997).
187. Doe, 138 F.3d at 668 (citing Smith, 128 F.3d at 1034).
188. Smith, 128 F.3d at 1033.
189. Doe, 138 F.3d at 667.
190. Id. at 668.
191. 154 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 1998).
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district court dismissed the plaintiffs' Title IX claim, citing the Tenth Circuit's
decision in Seamons v. Snow, 9 s on the grounds that the alleged harasser was
not an agent of the university; therefore, no liability could attach to the
university for his actions.' 96
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered the case in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Gebser 97 Although the court acknowledged that
Gebser was not a peer sexual harassment case, it nevertheless found the
Supreme Court's rejection of institutional liability through agency principles
in Title IX teacher-student cases instructive."' The Tenth Circuit used the
Supreme Court's analysis to develop a new test for institutional liability in Title
IX peer sexual harassment cases. The Tenth Circuit held:
Under the holding in Gebser, plaintiffs may proceed on
a claim under Title IX if they have sufficiently alleged that:
(1) they were subjected to quid pro quo sexual harassment or
subjected to a sexually hostile environment; (2) they brought
the situation to the attention of an official at the educational
institution receiving Title IX funds who had the "authority to
take corrective action" to remedy the harassment; and (3) that
the institution's response to the harassment amounted to
"deliberate indifference."'
199
Using this test, the Tenth Circuit determined that the plaintiffs in Morse
sufficiently stated a Title IX claim; therefore, the court remanded the case for
further proceedings on the Title IX claim.200
InMorse, the Tenth Circuit appears at first glance to be applying Gebser's
Title IX teacher-student liability standard to a peer sexual harassment case.
However, the Tenth Circuit never explicitly stated that it was treating Morse as
a peer sexual harassment case. In permitting Morse to bring a Title IX claim
against the university, the court stated that, "the ROTC program is a
University-sanctioned program and... a fellow student acting with authority
bestowed by that program and an ROTC officer responsible for administering
that program committed acts forbidden by Title IX."'O' The alleged harasser in
this case is both the plaintiffs' peer and superior. The court's language
throughout the opinion never clearly states whether the Tenth Circuit is
viewing the alleged harasser as a student or a "teacher" who created a sexually
hostile environment. Whether the Tenth Circuit viewed Morse as a quid pro
195. 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996).
196. Morse, 154 F.3d at 1127.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1127-28 (quoting Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989,
1999 (1998)).
200. Id. at 1129.
201. Id. at 1128.
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quo sexual harassment case or a hostile environment case is not clear. The
unique factual situation in this case and the lack of clarity by the court limits
Morse's instructive value in considering Title IX peer sexual harassment law.
7. Circuit Court Synthesis
As these decisions make clear, the United States Courts of Appeals are
split concerning whether and under what circumstances courts can find an
educational institution liable inpeer sexual harassment cases. The circuit courts
have attempted to reconcile the Supreme Court's confusing reference to Title
VII principles inFranklin (as clarified in Gebser) with the Court's requirement
that intentional discrimination be proven on the part of the school. The Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits represent one end of the spectrum.0 2 The Fifth Circuit
has established a standard that is nearly impossible for a plaintiff to meet,2"3
while the Eleventh Circuit's Spending Clause analysis has led it to conclude
that Title IX does not even create a cause of action for peer sexual
harassment."' On the other end of the spectrum are the Seventh and Fourth
Circuits, both of which recognize a cause of action against an educational
institution under Title IX for peer sexual harassment.20 5 The Fourth Circuit
attempted to adopt a liberal constructive notice standard of liability,206 which
has since been vacated, while the Seventh Circuit clearly requires actual notice
for liability to attach.207 In the middle are the Second208 and Tenth Circuits,
which have not definitively answered all of the questions on this issue. Only
the Tenth Circuit has decided without vacating a peer sexual harassment case
at the higher education level; and, only the Tenth Circuit has decided such a
case since the Supreme Court's 1998 Gebser decision. Whether other federal
courts will adopt the Tenth Circuit's new three-part test for institutional liability
for peer sexual harassment remains to be seen.
202. See supra Part III.B.I- .2.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 137-38.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 116, 118.
205. See supra text accompanying notes Part III.B.4-.5.
206. See supra text accompanying note 166.
207. See supra text accompanying note 187.
208. Although the Second Circuit has not addressed the issue of institutional liability
for peer sexual harassment, it considered the seemingly analogous issue of institutional liability
for sexual harassment of a student by a third party in Murray v. New York University College of
Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243 (2d Cir. 1995). Murray involved a Title IX gender discrimination claim
by a dental student against a university for failing to protect her from alleged sexual harassment
by a patient. Id. at 247. InMurray the Second Circuit seemed to conclude that Title VII standards
are applicable in a Title IX sexual harassment case involving a non-employee. Id. at 248-49. The
court stated that "[t]he Court's citation of Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, a Title VII
case ... indicates that, in a Title IX suit. . . based on sexual harassment of a student, an
educational institution may be held liable under standards similar to those applied in cases under
Title VII." Id. at 249 (citation omitted). However, the court stopped short of deciding whether
constructive or actual notice is required, because it found that the plaintiff failed to meet the less
stringent constructive notice standard. Id. at 250.
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The uncertainty in the circuit courts surrounding the issue of institutional
liability for peer sexual harassment in higher education has contributed to a
series of seemingly inconsistent decisions at the district court level. The debate
at the district court level has focused primarily on the type of notice a school
must have to be held liable under Title IX,209 while the circuit courts have, in
addition to notice, focused on whether institutional liability of any kind is
constitutionally permissible."' All of the reported peer sexual harassment cases
at the district court level seem to arise at the K-12 level, not at the college and
university level. Of the reported cases, the district court decisions fall into two
categories: (1) those requiring only constructive notice; and (2) those requiring
actual notice.21'
C. District Court Decisions Concerning Title IXPeer Sexual Harassment
1. Know or Should Have Known Standard
One of the earliest and most often cited United States district court
decisions on peer sexual harassment is Doe v. Petaluma City School District
("Petaluma 1").22 In Petaluma I the court dismissed a peer sexual harassment
claim, holding that Title IX does not permit an award of monetary damages in
a private action without proof of "intentional discrimination on the basis of sex
by an employee of the educational institution." ' 3 The District Court for the
Northern District of California later granted reconsideration of this holding in
Doe v. Petaluma City School District ("Petaluma II").2I4 Upon
reconsideration, the court tried to reconcile the uncertainties left by the
Supreme Court in the Franklin decision, writing "it is not clear how the Court
meant the 'intentional discrimination' standard it set in Franklin to relate to the
standard for liability for hostile work environment sexual harassment under
Title VII. The Court gave conflicting signals on this point."2 5 The Petaluma
209. See infra Part III.C. 1-.2.
210. See supra Part III.B.
211. One of the earliest district court decisions came in Garza v. Galena Park
Independent School District, 914 F. Supp. 1437 (S.D. Tex. 1994). In this case, the court did not
allow a peer sexual harassment claim to be brought under Title IX. Id. at 1438. However, this
decision was essentially overruled by the Fifth Circuit's decision in Rowinsky. Since Rowinsky,
the only district court decision that applied the disparate impact standard was Piwonka v.
Tidehaven Independent SchoolDistrict, 961 F. Supp. 169, 171 (S.D. Tex. 1997). In a very brief
opinion, the court quickly dismissed the peer sexual harassment claim under the Rowinsky
standard. Id. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania also considered the issue of peer sexual
harassment in Collier v. William Penn School District, 956 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. Pa. 1997) and
ruled that an intentional violation of Title IX is necessary in a peer sexual harassment claim.
However, the court's opinion did not provide a specific definition of an intentional violation,
212. 830 F. Supp. 1560 (N.D. Cal. 1993).
213. Id. at 1571.
214. 949 F. Supp. 1415 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
215. Id. at 1418.
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III court gave a great deal of weight to the Supreme Court's reference to
Meritor in its Franklin decision:
The Franklin Court must have been aware that the
appellate courts had fashioned a test for Title VII employer
liability pursuant to the Court's instructions inMeritor. Under
that test, an employer is liable for the existence of a hostile
environment in its workplace only if the employer failed to
take prompt remedial action after the employer actually knew
or should have known of the existence of the hostile
environment.216
The court then stated that "in Hacienda Hotel, adopting the 'knew or should
have known standard,' the Ninth Circuit apparently intended the standard to be
an intentional discrimination standard rather than a negligence standard."
217
Therefore, the court found that a school could intentionally discriminate against
a student on the basis of gender by having constructive notice of sexual
harassment and failing to act reasonably to protect its students. The court
concluded:
Thus it appears that school districts are on notice that
student-to-student sexual harassment is very likely in their
schools .... In light of this knowledge, if a school district
fails to develop and implement policies reasonably designed
to bring incidents of severe or pervasive harassment to the
attention of the appropriate officials, it must be inferred that
the district intended ... a hostile environment. Thus the Title
VII standard for intentional discrimination, which imposes
liability where the entity knows or should have known of the
hostile environment and fails to take remedial action, is the
appropriate standard.218
The court reconciled the conflicting themes of the Supreme Court's Franklin
decision by permitting intent to be inferred from a school's handling of a peer
sexual harassment claim once it has actual or constructive notice of the claim.
The Eastern District of Kentucky considered the question of peer sexual
harassment in Franks v. Kentucky Schoolfor the Deaf.219 The major debate in
the case centered around the notice required to impose institutional liability for
peer sexual harassment. The Franks court outlined the history of peer sexual
harassment and ruled that the know-or-should-have-known standard is the
216. Id. (citing EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir. 1989)).
217. Id. at 1423.
218. Id. at 1426.
219. 956 F. Supp. 741 (E.D. Ky. 1996).
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standard of notice that most closely coincides with the purpose of Title IX.22
Quoting the Eleventh Circuit's original, now vacated, Davis decision, the
Franks court held that a plaintiff "must prove that she 'complained to higher
management about the harassment or by showing the pervasiveness of the
harassment, which gives rise to the inference of knowledge or constructive
knowledge."'221 Therefore, the court deemed actual or constructive notice to be
sufficient.
InNicoleM. v. Martinez UnifedSchoolDistricf22 the Northern District of
California once again considered a peer sexual harassment claim. The court
followed its decision in Petaluma III, ruling that a school will be liable if it
"knew or should have known"' of the sexually hostile environment and failed
to act reasonably to solve the problem.224 The court gave a thorough history of
peer sexual harassment and the various tests that have been applied by courts
in assessing liability. 225 The court concluded "that the approach taken in Davis,
its progeny and Petaluma III is the better reasoned one. It is more consistent
with the purposes of Title IX and the well-developed body of law under Title
VII which the Franklin court implicitly found to be applicable. 226
2. Actual Knowledge Standard
In Bosley v. Kearney R-1 School Distric&27 the District Court for the
Western District of Missouri began its analysis by acknowledging that
intentional discrimination is a required element in any Title IX sexual
harassment claim against a school."2 While direct evidence obviously
establishes this intent, the court noted that "[d]iscriminatory intent may also be
established by inference. '29 Having established the intent requirement, the
court then developed its test for peer sexual harassment claims. In so doing, the
court quoted a five-part Title VII test similar to the one later adopted by the
220. Id. at 747-48.
221. Id. at 747 (quoting Davis v. Monroe Bd. of Educ., 74 F.3d 1186, 1195 (1 th Cir.
1996)).
222. 964 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
223. Id. at 1377 (quoting Petaluma Ii, 949 F. Supp. 1415, 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996)).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1372-78. The court noted that the Northern District of California
previously ruled on the question of notice in Oona R.-S. v. Santa Rosa City Schools, 890 F. Supp.
1452 (N.D. Cal. 1995). In Oona the court ruled that the reasoning of Franklin and Petaluma I
"persuasively establishes that intentional discrimination is an element of a Title IX claim against
an institutional defendant." Id. at 1466. The court did not explicitly address the question of the
standard of notice because the facts of the case established actual notice. However, the court in
Martinez did not give much weight to the decision in Oona as the court decided the latter case
in part upon the holding in Petaluma I, which was reconsidered in Petaluma III.
226. Martinez, 964 F. Supp. at 1377.
227. 904 F. Supp. 1006 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
228. Id. at 1020.
229. Id. at 1021.
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Eleventh Circuit in its original Davis decision." However, the court ultimately
rejected that test in favor of the following four-part test:
(1) the plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome sexual
harassment; (2) the harassment was based on sex; (3) the
harassment occurred during the plaintiff's participation in an
educational program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance; and (4) the school district knew of the harassment
and intentionally failed to take proper remedial action."
By adopting this test, the court accepted Title VII standards but required a
plaintiff to show the school district had actual knowledge of the sexual
harassment.
Following the Bosley decision, the Northern District of New York
considered a peer sexual harassment case in Bruneau v. South Kortright
CentralSchoolDistrict.2 InBruneau the court adopted, in large part, the five-
part test established in the original Davis decision. 3 However, in considering
the fifth part of the test, the standard of notice, the Bruneau court adopted an
actual notice standard." It did so on the basis of an analysis of agency law in
the employment context as compared to the educational context:
Students, per se, are not agents of the schools which they
attend. In order for agency principles to attach between a
student and their school there must be some manifestation of
consent by the student to the school that the student shall act
on the school's behalf and subject to the school's control, as
well as, consent from the school to the student's actions....
Therefore, although constructive notice principles properly
attach between employer and employee in the Title VII
context, they do not attach between the alleged harassing
student and the Defendants[] in this Title IX case.2 5
The court held that actual notice on the part of the school must be proven in
peer sexual harassment cases before the school can be held liable for the
sexually harassing conduct of its students. 6
The Northern District of Iowa followed a similar line of reasoning in apair
of peer sexual harassment decisions. In Wright v. Mason City Community
230. Id. at 1022-23 (citing Kopp v. Samaritan Health Sys., Inc., 13 F.3d 264 (8th Cir.
1993)).
231. Id. at 1023.
232. 935 F. Supp. 162 (N.D.N.Y. 1996).
233. Id. at 170-72.
234. Id. at 173.
235. Id. at 173-74.
236. Id. at 177.
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School Districtand Burrow v. Postville Community School District" the
court required a showing of intentional discrimination by the school. 9 In
addition, the court applied a variation of the five-part test developed in the
original, now vacated, Davis decision.24 In the fifth part of the test, which deals
with institutional liability, the court adopted an actual notice standard and
required "that the educational institution knew of the harassment and
intentionally failed to take proper remedial measures because of the plaintiffs
sex."24' The Burrow court continued its consideration of intentional
discrimination and held that "the Plaintiff may establish such intent through
either direct or indirect evidence, and that in the absence of direct evidence, an
intent to discriminate on the part of the school district may be inferred by the
finder of fact from the totality of relevant evidence."242 Under this standard, the
school is liable if it had actual knowledge of the harassment and negligently
failed to prevent it.
One of the most recent decisions on the issue of peer sexual harassment
comes from the District of New Hampshire in Doe v. Londonderry School
District.243 In that case, the court discussed the Guidance in the context of a
peer sexual harassment case.2" The court noted that the Guidance calls for the
adoption of a constructive notice standard on the question of institutional
liability.' s However, the court adopted a four-part test 246 that it created from the
237. 940 F. Supp. 1412 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
238. 929 F. Supp. 1193 (N.D. Iowa 1996).
239. Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1420; Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1205.
240. See Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1420; Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1205-06.
241. Wright, 940 F. Supp. at 1420; Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1205-06. The other four
elements that the court required are: (1) that the plaintiff is a member of a protected group; (2)
that the plaintiffwas subject to unwelcome sexual harassment; (3) that the harassment was based
on sex; and (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive so as to alter the
conditions of the plaintiffs education and create an abusive educational environment. Burrow,
929 F. Supp. at 1205.
242. Burrow, 929 F. Supp. at 1205.
243. 970 F. Supp. 64 (D.N.H. 1997).
244. Id. at 72-73.
245. Id. at 72.
246. The test calls for a showing that:
(I) the plaintiff was a student in an educational
program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance within the coverage of Title IX; (2) the
plaintiff was subjected to unwelcome sexual
harassment while aparticipantin the program; (3) the
harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive that
it altered the conditions of the plaintiff's education
and created a hostile or abusive educational
environment; and (4) the school district knew of the
harassment and intentionally failed to take proper
remedial action.
Id. at 74 (citations omitted).
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tests applied in Bosley,247 Seamons,248 and Wright.249 In the fourth part of its
test, the court required a showing that "the school district knew of the
harassment and intentionally failed to take proper remedial action, 250 thereby
rejecting the Guidance concerning the appropriate standard for institutional
liability for peer sexual harassment.
At present, only two district courts appear to consider constructive notice
sufficient to support institutional liability for peer sexual harassment."
Conversely, the majority of district courts require plaintiffs to prove actual
notice in order for liability to attach. 2  However, in determining what
constitutes actual notice, the district courts apply a number of different tests.
While the purpose of the Guidance may have been to serve as a guide for
courts, courts have not, in practice, followed the Department of Education's
recommendations. Only a handful of reported cases since the issuance of the
Guidance have addressed it and have rejected its constructive notice
standard.2 53 At least one circuit court decision rejects the directives of the
Guidance altogether as advisory, finding that it is not binding upon the
courts.
2 5 4
D. The Title 1K Case Law on Peer Sexual Harassment
One can draw several important observations and conclusions from an
analysis of the developing body of Title IX peer sexual harassment case law.
First, while the majority of the courts that have considered this issue recognize
some form of a cause of action for peer sexual harassment under Title IX, two
recently reported circuit court decisions either refuse to recognize such a claim
or limit institutional liability to those rare cases in which an institution handles
peer harassment cases involving males differently than cases involving females
on the basis of gender. 5 The Fourth Circuit's vacation and en banc rehearing
of its decision in Brzonkala may signal a similar move in yet another circuit. 6
Second, while the Seventh Circuit recognizes a cause of action for peer sexual
harassment under Title IX, it has rejected attempted imposition by the
247. Bosley v. Kearney R-1 Sch. Dist., 904 F. Supp. 1006,1022-23 (W.D. Mo. 1995).
248. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1232 (10th Cir. 1996).
249. Wright v. Mason City Community Sch. Dist., 940 F. Supp. 1412, 1420 (N.D.
Iowa 1996).
250. Doe v. Londonderry Sch. Dist., 970 F. Supp. 64, 74 (D.N.H. 1997).
251. The Northern District of California and the Eastern District of Kentucky. See
supra Part III.C.1.
252. See supra Part III.C.2.
253. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997);
Londonderry, 970 F. Supp. 64.
254. See Davis, 120 F.3d at 1404 n.23.
255. See id. at 1390; Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d 1006 (5th Cir.
1996).
256. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949 (4th Cir.
1997), vacated & reh'g granted (4th Cir. Feb. 5, 1998).
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Guidance and three United States district courts of a constructive notice
standard of liability.25 7 Third, and most notably for present purposes, only two
reported peer sexual harassment cases appear to consider the question of
institutional liability for peer sexual harassment at the higher education level. 8
However, even in those cases the courts do not discuss the appropriateness of
a distinction between the standard of liability for higher education peer sexual
harassment cases and similar cases arising at the kindergarten through high
school level. The assumption that the DOE relied upon this body of case law
in its adoption of the Guidance seems logical. Nevertheless, despite a dearth of
reported cases at the college or university level, the Guidance purports to apply
a constructive notice standard to peer sexual harassment in higher education as
well as K-12 institutions. 9
The constructive notice standard contained in the Guidance should not be
applied in the higher education setting for at least three reasons. Colleges and
universities (1) have fundamentally different relationships with their students,
(2) owe a different legal duty to their students, and (3) exercise a different level
of control over their students.
IV. K-12 RATIONALE NOT APPROPRIATE IN HIGHER EDUCATION CASES
The legal relationship between colleges and universities and their students
differs fundamentally from the relationship between primary or secondary
institutions ("K-12 institutions") and their students. First, courts across the
nation have consistently abrogated the doctrine of in locoparentis with respect
to colleges and universities but have refused to do so with respect to K-12
institutions.2 ° Second, as a practical matter, colleges and universities lack the
level of supervision and control over their students that K-12 institutions
have.261 In fact, K-12 students, as minors, spend virtually every moment of their
daily educational experience under the direct supervision of institutional
employees. College students, on the other hand, are adults. They spend far less
of their educational experience under the supervision of university officials,
and their relationships with their instructors and their institutions differ
substantially.
In light of these important distinctions between K- 12 and higher education
institutions, institutional liability for peer sexual harassment should not be
extended to colleges and universities, especially in the form mandated by the
now vacated Brzonkala decision and by the DOE in the Guidance. Instead, any
federal court to address this issue should follow the actual notice standard
adopted by the court in Morse and limit the liability of higher education
257. See Doe v. University of Ill., 138 F.3d 653 (7th Cir. 1998).
258. See supra Part III.B.4, III.B.6.
259. See supra note 15.
260. See infra Part IV.A.
261. See infra Part IV.C.
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institutions accordingly.
A. The Abrogation ofIn Loco Parentis in Higher Education
Unlike primary and secondary institutions, colleges and universities do not
stand in the place of parents vis-a-vis their students. The seminal case in this
area is Bradshaw v. Rawlings,262 in which the Third Circuit discussed the trend
away from the doctrine of in loco parentis and provided the following
commentary on the relationship between a modem college and its students:
Our beginning point is a recognition that the modem
American college is not an insurer of the safety of its
students. Whatever may have been its responsibility in an
earlier era, the authoritarian role of today's college
administrations has been notably diluted in recent decades.
Trustees, administrators, and faculties have been required to
yield to the expanding rights and privileges of their
students.... College students today are no longer minors;
they are now regarded as adults in almost every phase of
community life. . . . There was a time when college
administrators and faculties assumed a role in loco parentis.
Students were committed to their charge because the students
were considered minors. A special relationship was created
between college and student that imposed a duty on the
college to exercise control over student conduct and,
reciprocally, gave the students certain rights of protection by
the college. The campus revolutions of the late sixties and
early seventies were a direct attack by the students on rigid
controls by the colleges and were an all-pervasive affirmative
demand for more student rights. In general, the students
succeeded, peaceably and otherwise, in acquiring a new
status at colleges throughout the country. These movements,
taking place almost simultaneously with legislation and case
law lowering the age of majority, produced fundamental
changes in our society .... Regulation by the college of
student life on and off campus has become limited.263
The court in Beach v. University of Utah2" echoed this sentiment by writing:
[C]olleges and universities are educational institutions, not
custodial.. . . It would be unrealistic to impose upon an
262. 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979).
263. Id. at 138-40.
264. 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986).
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institution of higher education the additional role ofcustodian
over its adult students .. . Fulfilling this charge would
require the institution to babysit each student, a task beyond
the resources of any school. But more importantly, such
measures would be inconsistent with the nature of the
relationship between the student and the institution, for it
would produce a repressive and inhospitable environment,
largely inconsistent with the objectives of a modem college
education.265
Numerous other courts considering this issue have followed suit, holding that
"[t]he in loco parentis doctrine is outmoded and inconsistent with the reality of
contemporary collegiate life.
2 66
However, in primary and secondary schools the doctrine of in locoparentis
is alive and well267 primarily because mandatory schooling has required parents
to rely upon school districts to care for their children during the day. Because
higher education is not mandatory and college students (as adults) do not
require the care of others during the educational process, the courts no longer
recognize an in loco parentis relationship with respect to these students. The
same rationale which supported the abrogation of the in locoparentis doctrine
in higher education supports the courts' longstanding imposition of divergent
legal duties onhigher education institutions and K-12 institutions vis-a-vis their
students.
B. Divergent Legal Duties
Even outside the realm of institutional liability for peer sexual harassment,
courts have long drawn a distinction between the duty owed by K-12
institutions to their students for injuries or damages they sustain at the hand of
third parties and the duty owed by colleges and universities to their students for
injuries caused by third parties.
265. Id. at 419 (citations omitted).
266. Nero v. Kansas State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 778 (Kan. 1993); see also Hartman
v. Bethany College, 778 F. Supp. 286,293 (N.D. W. Va. 1991) ("The recent trend in the case law
is against finding an in loco parentis relationship between colleges or universities and their
students."); Klobuchar v. Purdue Univ., 553 N.E.2d 169, 171 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) ("College
students are not children and colleges 'are not expected to assume a role anything akin to in loco
parentis or a general insurer."' (quoting Campbell v. Board of Trustees of Wabash College, 495
N.E.2d 227, 232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986))).
267. See, e.g., Rupp v. Bryant, 417 So. 2d 658, 666 (Fla. 1982) ("The genesis of this
supervisory duty is based on the school employee standing partially in the place of the student's
parents."); Kimberly S. M. v. Bradford Cent. Sch., 649 N.Y.S.2d 588, 589-90 (App. Div. 1996)
("The duty owed by a school to its students 'stems from the fact of its physical custody over
them. .. ."' (quoting Pratt v. Robinson, 349 N.E.2d 849, 852 (N.Y. 1976))).
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1. The Duty Owed Students by Colleges and Universities
In order for a court to impose a legal duty on a defendant at common law,
"it must balance the following factors: (1) the relationship between the parties,
(2) the reasonable foreseeability of harm to the person injured, and'(3) public
policy concerns."26 Generally, modem courts refuse to recognize any sort of
"special relationship" between a university and its students.269 Therefore, many
courts do not recognize a common law duty upon the institution to protect its
students from the unforeseeable actions of a third party. Thus, absent a
foreseeable injury or assault by a third party, no duty exists on the part of a
university to protect its students from an assault; and, absent a duty which
could be breached, there canbe no liability for negligence as a matter of law.
271
Whether a duty exists is a question of law for the court.272 At least one court
that has considered this issue has held that "[a] duty to anticipate and to take
steps to protect against a criminal act arises only when the facts of a particular
case make it reasonably foreseeable that a criminal act is likely to occur.
273
Thus, at common law, if a college or university did not know and could not
have reasonably foreseen that one student would harm another, and if the
college or university had no opportunity to intervene to stop the alleged injury
or assault, most courts would conclude that the assault was not reasonably
foreseeable. In such situations, the university would not owe a legal duty to its
students to protect them from the assault. The same is not true of K-12
institutions because the courts have almost uniformly recognized that they owe
a higher duty to their students.274
2. The Duty Owed Students by K-12 Institutions
Individuals charged with the care of minors owe them a legal duty far
268. Motz v. Johnson, 651 N.E.2d 1163, 1166 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995).
269. See, e.g., Crow v. California, 271 Cal. Rptr. 349,359 (Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting
claim of special relationship between university and students). But see Furek v. University of
Del., 594 A.2d 506, 520 (Del. 1991) ("[W]here there is direct university involvement in, and
knowledge of, certain dangerous practices of its students the university cannot abandon its
residual duty of control.").
270. See, e.g., Klobucharv. PurdueUniv., 553 N.E.2d 169, 174 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990)
(refusing to impose duty on Purdue to protect students from third parties); see also Nero v.
Kansas State Univ., 861 P.2d 768, 778 (Kan. 1993) ("[U]niversity-student relationship does not
in and of itself impose a duty upon universities to protect students from the actions of fellow
students or third parties.").
271. See Webb v. Jarvis, 575 N.E.2d 992, 995 (Ind. 1991) (listing elements of
negligence).
272. See Douglass v. Irvin, 549 N.E.2d 368, 369 (Ind. 1990); Motz, 651 N.E.2d at
1166 (citing Webb, 575 N.E.2d at 995).
273. Mott, 651 N.E.2d at 1167.
274. See infra Part IV.B.2.
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higher than the legal duty that colleges or universities owe to adult students. 27 5
In defining the legal duty that school districts owe K-12 students, at least one
court has said:
It is well settled that "[a] school district owes a duty to its
students to exercise the same degree of care toward them as
would a reasonably prudent parent under similar
circumstances." Stated another way, a school district has "a
special relationship to its students . . . analogous to that
between cariers and their passengers or innkeepers and their
guests." A school district, however, is not an insurer of the
safety of its students. The duty of a school district to its
students "is strictly limited by time and space" and exists
"only so long as a student is in its care and custody during
school hours, and terminates when the child has departed
from the school's custody.
276
Thus, school districts stand in the shoes of parents while students are in their
care and custody.
School districts owe their students a much higher legal duty than do
colleges and universities. The "special relationship" between K-12 institutions
and their students "'requires a school to act when a child, while in its charge,
is threatened by the negligence of a third party, and it must make reasonable
efforts to anticipate such threats.' 277 This is an affirmative duty. No similar
duty is imposed upon colleges and universities.
C. Differing Levels of Control Over Students
Another critical distinction between K-12 institutions and higher education
institutions arises out of the level of control each institution is able to exercise
over its students. Colleges and universities have far less control over their
students than K-12 institutions. Students in K-12 are in the presence and under
the supervision of their teachers whenever they are at school. On the other
hand, college students spend only a small percentage of their college
275. See Gloria "X" v. Gibbs, 659 N.Y.S.2d 349, 351 (App. Div. 1997); Cole v.
Fairchild, 482 S.E.2d 913, 922 n.9 (W. Va. 1996) ("'As a general rule, a person who undertakes
the control and supervision ofa child, even without compensation, has the duty to use reasonable
care to protect the child from injury."') (quoting Laite v. Baxter, 191 S.E.2d 531, 534 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1972)); Doe v. Boys Clubs of Greater Dallas, Inc., 868 S.W.2d 942, 950-51 (Tex. App.
1994) aff'd, 907 S.W.2d 472 (Tex. 1995) ("Organizations whose primary function is the care and
education of children owe a higher duty to their patrons .... ).
276. Harker v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 661 N.Y.S.2d 332,334 (App. Div. 1997)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
277. Kimberly S. M. v. Bradford Cent. Sch., 649 N.Y.S.2d 588,590 (App. Div. 1996)
(quoting Pratt v. Robinson, 349 N.E.2d 849, 852 (N.Y. 1976)).
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experience in the classroom or in the presence of institutional employees. For
the most part, college students are emancipated adults living on their own.
College and university employees are rarely present when students interact with
one another privately. College students generally are more mature than their K-
12 counterparts. Moreover, most colleges and universities lack the resources,
the desire, the ability, and the political will to exercise supervision or "control"
over their students. As adults, most college students are understandably more
resistant to close supervision than are K-12 students. These characteristics are
among the many reasons why the courts have abrogated the in loco parentis
doctrine at the college and university level.
Extending the rationale of the K-12 peer sexual harassment cases to higher
education directly contradicts the divergent legal duties that higher education
institutions and K-12 institutions owe students. The widespread abrogation of
the in loco parentis doctrine at the college and university level, but not at the
K-12 level, and the differing levels of control these two distinct types of
educational institutions have and exercise over their students proves this
hypothesis.
D. Courts Should Reject the Guidance's Constructive Notice Standard
The constructive notice standard proposed by the Guidance is against the
great weight of applicable legal authority and is contrary to an apparent trend
in the case law at the circuit court level, and, on the basis of Gebser, perhaps
at the Supreme Court level. To suggest that colleges and universities owe
students the same duties as K-12 institutions, even though the former lack the
control necessary to discharge adequately those duties, defies logic and
common sense. Simply stated, to expect colleges and universities to bear full
responsibility for peer sexual harassment, when they lack the control necessary
to prevent it, to become aware of it, or to effectively police it on their
campuses, is untenable and ill advised.
For the OCR to extend the rationale of the K-12 peer sexual harassment
cases (and the Title VII constructive notice standard) to higher education is
contrary to the well-established case law on in locoparentis and legal duty for
negligence, as well as the conditions at most American colleges and
universities with respect to institutional control over students. Moreover,
compliance with the mandatory Guidance imposes upon American colleges and
universities a virtually impossible task: the duty to become the insurers of
students' safety and to protect them from harm caused by other students, even
though the institution and its representatives are rarely present when incidents
of sexual harassment occur. To discharge this duty effectively would require
these institutions to post guards in each dormitory room and every building
where students live, work, or socialize on a 24-hour-per-day, 365-day-per-year
basis. Such measures would be tantamount to making babysitters out of college
and university officials.
This administrative attempt to reinstate the in locoparentis doctrine at the
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college and university level, which courts across the country have abrogated,
should be rejected by courts addressing the issue. The Guidance substantially
increases the risk of liability for colleges and universities and threatens to open
further the floodgates of litigation. The Guidance artificially creates a demand
for a new bureaucracy on American campuses geared toward identifying,
investigating, and handling peer sexual harassment complaints. The expense
of this bureaucracy will be paid by institutions already burdened in many
instances by declining enrollment, declining revenue, and increased budget
shortfalls. Such an expense detracts from the academic missions of universities
and constitutes a drain on institutional resources away from mission-driven
activities. This expense might also create an adverse relationship between
harassment victims and colleges and universities fearful of litigation.
Peer sexual harassment cases put universities in the middle of disputes
involving two or more of its students, often in a highly charged atmosphere
pitting one student's word against another's. Universities are ill-equipped to be
the arbiter of truth in such situations, especially when the university itself is
facing potential liability. Given the Hobson's choice of a lawsuit by the alleged
victim for sexual harassment and a lawsuit by the alleged perpetrator for due
process violations, breach of contract, or defamation, universities are not well-
situated to render a decision on responsibility or culpability for the alleged
harassment. The truth often is elusive in such cases anyway. The courts, not
institutions of higher learning, are better equipped to find the truth and to
resolve disputes involving allegations of peer sexual harassment.
The K-12 case law on peer sexual harassment has led some school districts
to overreact to complaints and to adopt overreaching sexual harassment
policies. As noted at the outset of this Article, at the K-12 level this reality
sometimes leads to absurd results, ranging from allegations of sexual
harassment levied againstprimary school students forplaying tag, kissing a girl
on the playground, or telling a boy she likes him. At the higher education level,
the dangers of absurd results are just as likely. Sexual harassment policies at
colleges and universities that are too strict could well lead to higher education
institutions' treating adults like children, driving a wedge between academic
institutions and their students.
To resolve this issue, the federal courts should adopt the rationale of the
Tenth Circuit in Morse27 and the analogous rationale of the Supreme Court in
Gebser,279 declining to follow the Guidance on peer sexual harassment with
respect to constructive notice. Moreover, courts addressing this issue should
find, as did the Fifth Circuit inRowinsky2 80 and the Eleventh Circuit inDavis,
28'
that Title VII principles do not apply in Title IX peer sexual harassment cases.
At the very least courts should find, as did the Seventh Circuit in Doe and the
278. See discussion supra Part III.B.6.
279. See discussion supra Part III.A.
280. See supra Part III.B.2.
281. See supra Part III.B.1.
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Tenth Circuit in Morse, that colleges and universities are not liable for peer
sexual harassment on a constructive notice standard.282 The appropriate
standard of liability, if any, is the actual notice standard adopted in Doe,283
Gebser,284 and Morse.28s
V. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, what is needed is a uniform, nationwide standard of
liability to resolve the current split in the federal courts on the issue of college
and university liability for peer sexual harassment. The United States Supreme
Court needs to resolve the question of whether a cause of action under Title IX
for peer sexual harassment is constitutionally permissible, even though
Congress enacted Title IX under the Spending Clause, not under the Fourteenth
Amendment or the Commerce Clause. The Supreme Court also should
determine, unequivocally, whether Title VII principles apply in Title IX peer
sexual harassment cases. If the Court answers either of these questions in the
affirmative, it should finally determine the appropriate standard for institutional
liability (e.g., actual notice or constructive notice) for peer sexual harassment
on American college campuses. For the reasons set forth above, the Court
should draw a sharp distinction between the standard ofpeer sexual harassment
liability for K-12 institutions and higher education institutions. As indicated
above, the relationship enjoyed by higher education institutions and their
students is fundamentally different from the relationship between K-12
institutions and their students.
In the absence of clear guidance from the United States Supreme Court on
these issues, the split of authority among the federal circuit courts is likely to
continue. American colleges and universities will have little alternative but to
follow the Guidance and its constructive notice standard, behaving in all
respects as though a cause of action under Title IX for peer sexual harassment
exists. Furthermore, higher education institutions will have to assume that the
constructive notice standard of liability mandated by the Guidance applies in
all peer sexual harassment cases. Such a result would be unfortunate, because
the vast majority of courts to address the issue in recent years have adopted an
actual notice standard. It also would be unfortunate for practical reasons,
because a constructive notice standard forces university officials to avoid legal
liability for peer sexual harassment by interjecting themselves into the private
lives and relationships of their students, most of whom are emancipated adults.
University officials are neither suited nor qualified for this role, and it would
represent a return to the now abrogated in loco parentis doctrine on American
college campuses.
282. See supra Part III.B.5-.6.
283. See discussion supra Part III.B.5.
284. See discussion supra Part III.A.
285. See discussion supra Part III.B.6.
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